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RIGHTS OF TICKETHOLDERS TO PLACES
OF AMUSEMENTS
MANNES F. GRFNBERG*
Greenfeld v. Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore'
This was a suit in equity in which the plaintiff prayed,
first, for a declaratory decree stating that he is entitled,
upon payment of admission charges, to attend any racing
meetings conducted by the defendant, and, secondly, an
injunction restraining the defendapt from denying the
plaintiff such right herein alleged and from interfering
with plaintiff while he is in attendance as a spectator and
bettor at any racing meeting. Plaintiff, in his bill, alleged
that he was forcibly ejected from defendant's racing track
without just cause, after having purchased a ticket thereto
and having been admitted into defendant's enclosure upon
presentment of that ticket. A demurrer to plaintiff's bill
was sustained by the lower court and the Court here af-
firmed the ruling given below.
The demurrer, of course, raises merely the very broad
question of law, namely, does the plaintiff's bill set forth a
cause of action. By claiming the right to non-interference
by defendant while in attendance at a racing meet, plain-
tiff, in effect, is claiming that a ticket of admission to de-
fendant's track creates a property right in favor of the
ticketholder. And by claiming a right to attend any racing
meet upon payment of admission charges, plaintiff is claim-
ing the primary right to acquire the property right arising
out of the purchase of a ticket. Such rights, plaintiff asserts,
exist by virtue of the common law and also by virtue of
the Racing Commission Law,2 which grants to the defendant
a special privilege or franchise to conduct racing meeting
with pari-mutuel betting. It is contended that defendant
has no right to conduct such business as a matter of right.
Such a business, it is claimed, cannot be considered a pri-
vate business, but rather a public or quasi-public function,
in the control, conduct, and management of which the
state participates in order to protect the public interest.
Since defendant was granted a franchise to carry out cer-
tain public purposes such as legalizing "gambling and bet-
ting under state supervision", providing "revenue for the
* B.S., 1947, Loyola College; third year student, University of Maryland
School of Law.
157 A. (2d) 335 (Md. 1948).
2 Md. Code (1939) Art. 78B, and Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 78B.
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state", and improving "the breed of horses", defendant is
obliged to afford to all citizens the equal right to enjoy its
facilities. Plaintiff further contended that his ejection from
the track without just cause or reason was a violation of
Rule 226 of Art 78 B of the Code, which provides: "The
chief inspector shall keep a record of the names and ad-
dresses of all persons ejected by any association from its
grounds, together with the offense or offenses alleged
against them, and any other material information relating
thereto, and the associations shall report all ejections to
the chief inspector. He shall promptly report the same to
the Maryland Racing Commission." Plaintiff seems to have
interpreted this rule to mean, by implication, that an ejec-
tion from any race track within the state can only be occa-
sioned for a just cause or reason. Plaintiff finally charged
that his ejection and defendant's continued refusal to per-
mit him to attend the races constitute acts which are "ille-
gal, capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory" and which
deprive plaintiff of his rights and privileges guaranteed
to the plaintiff by Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights
and of immunities, privileges and equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, due to the fact that
defendant is a duly constituted agent of the State of Mary-
land when conducting racing meetings.
The plaintiff's right to acquire a ticket of admission to
a race track or any place of amusement will first be con-
sidered. Under the common law, the operation of a baseball
enterprise, race track, theatre, or any other amusement is
held to be a private business, which is not conducted by
virtue of authority derived from the state, and, in conse-
quence, is not governed by rules relating to common car-
riers. As private businesses, such enterprises can be con-
trolled by and at the sheer will and volition of their pro-
prietors, who maintain their freedom of contract both as
to subject matter and parties. Now, a common carrier, due
to its public calling and the public nature of its business,
is bound to receive for carriage, without discrimination,
all persons who offer to become its passengers, unless a
reasonable excuse exists for the denial of carriage.3 Such
duty arises independent of contract. On the other hand,
an owner of a private business may choose those with
whom he does business. The proprietor of an amusement
enterprise, which is considered a private business under
the common law, has, therefore, the right of selecting those
8 13 C. J. S., Sec. 538, n. 9.
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with whom he wishes to contract, which right includes
that of selecting the patrons. Hence, such an amusement
operator can refuse admission to anyone whomsoever, the
law assuming that he will exercise good judgment in the
exclusion of patrons.4 This matter was adequately summed
up in People v. Flynn,5 in which case the court said that
a proprietor of an amusement place can exercise absolute
control over the house and audience; that since his author-
ity to carry on business is not derived from the state, he
may conduct his business as any other private citizen and
make whatever rules he desires as to the exclusion of
patrons. In the Greenfeld case,6 the Court declared that
the above rule is not archaic, except in the case of common
carriers, innkeepers, and similar public callings, quoting
from the case of Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club,7
in which it was held that a proprietor of a racing track
"has the power to admit as spectators only those whom he
may select, and to exclude others solely of his own volition,
as long as the exclusion is not founded on race, creed, color,
or national origin". The last quoted clause is applicable
in states having a Civil Rights Law.
It appears that in the case before us, the defendant
Jockey Club had declared to the plaintiff its unwillingness
to contract with plaintiff, who was ejected from the de-
fendant's track on two successive days and told not to
return and, if he did return, he would be denied admission.
At least, the intent of the defendant was made known after
the first ejection of the plaintiff. The Court now says that
plaintiff could not have thereafter purchased a ticket of
admission "unless by concealing his identity or by indirec-
tion or by mistake made known to him".' Hence, the Court
indicates that it would agree in holding that if a person
fraudulently, through a third person or otherwise, obtains
a ticket of admission to a place of amusement, knowing that
the proprietor thereof would not consent to sell him such
ticket, the proprietor may eject that person from the
premises, without a complaint on part of the supposed
patron, the theory being that there exists no contract be-
tween the proprietor and the patron as there is lacking the
necessary contractual intent on the part of the proprietor
'52 Am. Jur., Theaters, Shows, Exhibitions, etc., Sec. 3; 62 C. J., Theaters
and Shows, Art. II.
5 189 N. Y. 180, 82 N. E. 169, 12 Ann. Cas. 420 (1907).
0 Supra, n. 1, 337.
'296 N. Y. 249, 72 N. E. 2d 697, 698. 1 A. L. R. 2d 1160, 1162 (1947).
'S upra, n. 1, 337.
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and, hence, there is lacking the necessary meeting of
minds.9
Now, of course, the common law right of a proprietor
to do business as he wishes, and his right to select his
patrons may be limited to some extent by statute. ° The
operation of an amusement open to members of the public
is affected with a public interest, which interest justifies
legislative regulation of and interference with such an
amusement. But the mere fact that a business is affected
by a public interest or that it is subject to statutory regula-
tion does not make that business a servant of the public
in the sense a common carrier is a servant of the public
anymore than does the regulation of a private carrier make
it a common carrier." The right to enter into such business
is a common law right. No special consent of the state need
be had, as long as the necessary license is obtained, the
granting of which is dependent on whether such enterprise
will be supported by and successfully integrated into the
community, or whether such enterprise will be beneficial
to the community, rather than on the fact of whether such
an enterprise is a necessity to the community. The right
to stay in such business is a common law right; the right
to use the assets of the business for any purposes what-
soever and the right to terminate such business are com-
mon law rights. Contrast to this the derivation of the
common carrier's right to do business. That authority of
the common carrier is created by a franchise granted by
the state, which franchise grants power nonexistent at
common law; and, by virtue of such grant, certain obliga-
tions are imposed upon the recipient, duties that the state
would have to perform if no such franchise was granted
and accepted. It is wise to keep this in mind-the distinc-
tion between a statute limiting one's common law rights
and a franchise which confers rights on an individual,
which rights did not exist at common law. The acceptance
of a franchise to perform public functions is also an accep-
tance of public duties, whereas no public duty can arise
in the operation of a private business. From a practical
standpoint, the contention that a business is a public one,
because it is subject to state regulation, is absurd; for what
9 Said v. Butt, 3 K. B. 497, 36 Times L. R. 762 (1920).
10 Supra, n. 3.
n Rutledge Ass'n. v. Baughman, 153 Md. 297, 138 A. 29, 56 A. L. R. 1042
(1927). Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 81 A. L. R.
1402 (1932), holding the licensing regulation and taxation of a private
carrier does not make it a common carrier.
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business is now free from state regulation? If the conten-
tion were true, would any business be private in nature?
Turning to the consideration of the operation of a race
track specifically, it is found that the right to operate such
a project existed at common law since even this type of
wagering was not illegal under common law."2 In Maryland,
it was not until 1890 that betting on horse races, except
within the enclosures of properly licensed racing tracks,
was made illegal.13 Consequently, the Court held that "the
license, instead of creating a privilege (as does a franchise),
merely permits the exercise of one restricted and regulated
by statute". 4 Hence, the conducting of a race track alone
is not a public function but rather remains a private busi-
ness and may be conducted as such.
Even though a business is private, it appears that special
statutes may confer special privileges on members of the
public. California has interpreted its Civil Rights Law as
conferring on each citizen the right to gain admission to
any amusement open to the public, 5 while New York has
taken the contrary view."0 No such Civil Rights Law exists
in Maryland. As for our present Racing Commission Law,
the Court held this to be merely for the regulation of the
conduct and operation of and the betting within the tracks
of the licensees, for the protection of the betting public,
and for the acquisition and collection of revenue. But "the
law confers no personal right on individuals to attend or
bet at racing meetings. If it empowers the commission to
require a licensee to admit all comers as spectators and
bettors unless excluded for good cause (as to which we
intimate no opinion), the commission has not done this
by implication by Rule 226."'l Thus, defendant here still
maintains a right to exclude those that it wishes from its
track, not having to give any reason for such exclusion;
and, consequently, plaintiff has no right, under the com-
mon law or statute, to demand admission thereto.
Now, assuming that the defendant had voluntarily sold
to the plaintiff a ticket of admission, and plaintiff thereby
enters upon the defendant's premises, does the plaintiff
now have a right in rem, a property right in defendant's
premises, a right of noninterference by the defendant ex-
2James v. State, 63 Md. 242 (1885). Lafontaine v. Wilson, 185 Md. 673,
45 A. 2d 729, 162 A. L. R. 1218 (1946).
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 290.
Supra, n. 1, 339.
"Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n., 140 Cal. 357, 73 P. 1050 (1903).
"Supra, n. 7.
"Supra, n. 1, 338.
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cept for just cause; or does the plaintiff merely have a con-
tract right, termed a "license", which is revocable at the
sheer will of defendant? For the purpose of discussion, we
here must accept, without controversy, the holding of a
vast majority of cases that a license is not a property right
in favor of the licensee, but a mere contractual right, which
the licensor has the power, as distinguished from the right,
to revoke at his option. To hold that a license is a property
interest would totally defeat the question now presented
and would render this discussion valueless, for if a license
were a right in rem, it would be immaterial whether entry
into a place of amusement pursuant to the purchase of a
ticket created a license or some other property interest.
Hence, Chief Justice Vaughan's definition of the term
"license" will here be accepted, to wit: "A dispensation or
license properly passeth no interest nor alters or transfers
property in anything, but only makes an action lawful,
which without it had been unlawful.""i Putting it in an-
other way, a license is said to be "merely a permission to
do an act which, without such permission, would amount
to a trespass."'
The Court accepts the view that has been commonly
accepted in this country, that is, that a ticket to a place of
amusement merely creates a license." As mere license, it
is revocable at the will of the proprietor of the amusement,
even after the patron has taken the seat assigned him.2'
True, from the purchase of the ticket arises a contract,
damages for the breach of which are recoverable by the
patron; but such contract merely binds the person of the
proprietor and not his property, since such a contract is
not deemed sufficient to create a property interest. Justice
Holmes assigns as the reasons why a ticket does not create
a property interest the facts that it is not under seal and
that it was never intended by the parties as a conveyance.22
Judge Clark, in agreeing with Justice Holmes that a ticket
creates a license (though holding such license irrevocable)
assigns as his sole reason the fact that the parties never
intended a sale of an interest in land, saying that "both
theatre proprietor and theatre patron would be surprised
8 Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan, 329, 351, 124 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1109 (C. P.
1673).19 Cllfford v. O'Neill, 12 App. Div. 17, 29, 42 N. Y. S. 607, 609 (1896);
Shipley v. Fink, 102 Md. 219, 226, 62 A. 360, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002 (1905);
Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533, 538 (1814).
Supra, n. 1, 339.
21 Cases collected In 30 A. L. R. 951; 60 A. L. R. 1089.
Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633, 636, 637, 43 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 961 (1913).
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to learn that the purchase of a ticket 'to see a show' was
a sale of land."2 Professor Conard, however, in his article,
An Analysis of Licenses in Land,24 tries to refute the view
of Justice Holmes and Clark in saying that the parties did
intend to create an interest in land for as long as the
spectacle lasts. Conard might find difficulty in defending
his position if asked: "What did the parties really intend
to pass to the patron, a mere interest in land or a mere
permission to see the spectacle upon the proprietor's prem-
ises?" The view of Professor Conard might be a means of
demonstrating how an interest could possibly pass to the
patron in the cases under discussion, but it is rather hard
to find a mutual intent, between the parties, that a prop-
erty interest should pass out of the proprietor and into
the patron. Of course, the proprietor, when selling the
ticket of admission, probably intended to be bound there-
by, but this intention does not include the intent to make
a conveyance. And to this must be added the fact that
most tickets today state on their face that they merely
create a revocable license.
Such a clause does not necessarily create a license, as
the relationship between the parties is a matter of law
rather than a matter of what the parties call such relation-
ship. But, such a clause expressly negates the existence
of any intention on the part of the proprietor to make a
conveyance.
The first case holding that a ticket of admission to a
spectacle merely created a revocable license was Wood v.
Leadbitter,25 which, like the case before us, involved a
ticket to view races, which were to be conducted over a
period of several days. The Court in that case held that,
since an incorporeal interest could be created only by a
grant (an instrument under seal) and since there existed
no such grant in the case, there was created only a mere
license, always revocable. It was also said that the plain-
tiff might have an action for breach of contract, but this
is not the result of having an interest in rem, an interest
in the racing track. The Wood case overruled the previous
case of Taylor v. Waters,"6 in which a silver token that
represented a ticket to all performances to be held in a
certain opera house over a period of twenty-one years was
held to have given rise to an irrevocable license. The Wood
23 Clark, Covenants and Interests Running with the Land (2d Fd. 1947)
51.
2" (1942) 42 Col. L. Rev. 809.
213 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (1845).
" 7 Taunt. 374, 129 Eng. Rep. 150 (C. P. 1816).
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case was believed to have settled the law in England and
was followed by the American courts.
However, the main grounds on which the ruling of the
Wood case was based do not seem to be valid anymore,
as most states have abolished the necessity of using a seal
when making a conveyance, and Maryland does not re-
quire a seal on instruments conveying estates of seven years
or less.27 However, even though a seal is not required at
the present time, a ticket still would not constitute a con-
veyance of an incorporeal interest, because a writing is
required to convey such an interest under Section 3 of
the Statute of Frauds and a ticket is not a sufficient writing
to constitute a conveyance due to the fact that it does not
designate the grantee, another requirement essential to
the validity of any conveyance. Connected with this idea
is the question of whether the ticket represents a contract
to make a conveyance which contract equity can enforce.
True, the ticket is a writing, and the signature of the pro-
prietor can be found thereon, as any mark can be adopted
as a signature; but, even so, is this enough to constitute a
sufficient memorandum that will satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, compliance with which is the only prerequisite to
equity's enforcement of a contract to execute a convey-
ance? Now, in the case of a railroad ticket, the ticket itself
has been considered the contract, s but only one case has
applied this view to theatre tickets and the like. 9 The bet-
ter holding is that a theatre ticket is merely a receipt and
not a contract.3 And as a memorandum, a ticket seems
clearly insufficient because it does not designate the patron,
the would-be grantee; and, hence, as it does not name the
parties to the contract, it does not set forth all the essential
terms thereof, a requirement which must be met before
a writing can serve as a memorandum. Unless some theory,
analogous to that of partial performance, can be advanced
so that the particular case, upon its facts, can be taken out
of the scope of the Statute of Frauds it is doubtful whether
equity would enforce a ticket of admission as, or make it
operative as, a contract for the sale of land.
Taking the Wood case as the law of England, most of
the American cases merely cite and follow the bare propo-
27 Md. Code (1939) Art. 21, Sec. 1.
0 Comment, The Nature of Railroad Tickets (1896) 9 Har. L. Rev. 353.
Interstate Amusement Co. v. Martin, 8 Ala. App. 481, 62 So. 404 (1913).
9 Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512, 13 Am. Rep. 617 (1.874) ; Note, Effect of
Time Limitations in Tickets over Connecting Railroads, (1910) 10 Col. L.
Rev. 345; Note, Carriers-Ticket-Tim-e Limit (1912) 7 Il. L. Rev. 130:
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Turner, 100 Tenn. 213, 43 L. R. A. 140 (1898).
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sition laid down in that case, to wit, a ticket of admission
is a mere license, revocable at will. However, that English
case was overruled by Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Limited, 1
which arose out of the plaintiff's ejection from a theatre
after taking his seat on the grounds that the management
had suspected him of not paying for his admission. Dam-
ages for assault and false imprisonment were granted,
after the jury found that the plaintiff had paid for his seat,
the court ruling that one who has taken his seat in the
theatre cannot be ejected without just cause. The decision
of this case was put on three grounds: (1) That the thing
granted to the plaintiff was a right to view a spectacle,
which right was an actual grant and the license to enter
defendant's theatre was merely incidental to the grant,
and, as such, was a license coupled with an interest which
cannot be revoked. (2) That if the ticket contained a seal
thereon, it would operate as a conveyance at law of an
irrevocable property interest; however, equity will enforce
such an instrument and decree that such conveyance be
made, and, as the Judicature Act has merged equity into
law, the law court can now treat such contract as an ex-
ecuted conveyance. (3) That the contract creating the
license created an implied contract not to revoke the license,
and such implied contract is an enforceable right in equity.
When there exists a license coupled with an interest,
that interest is always found to be a right in tangible
property, real or personal, and the license is merely inci-
dental to that property right and exists merely to make
possible the exercise of that right. But in the Hurst case,
the right to see a spectacle was the interest that was coupled
with the license, so as to make it irrevocable. Such a view
seems odd and unique indeed. Actually there was no inter-
est in the spectacle granted; there was merely granted a
right to see the spectacle, which is nothing more than a
contract right, a mere license to go on the premises for
a specified reason. As Pollock said, "the cases (referring
to those in which the license was found to be coupled with
an interest) must not be confused with the Wood v. Lead-
bitter class, where the license is not ancillary to another
object, but is itself the principal matter".32 And quoting
Justice Holmes, "While there might be an irrevocable right
of entry under a contract incident to a right of property in
land or in goods thereon, where the contract stands by
itself, it must be a conveyance or a mere revocable
1 K. B. 1 (1915).
82 Pollock, Torts (14th ed. 1939) 302.
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license".3 Hence, it seems that to hold a license to enter an
amusement place is one coupled with an interest is stretch-
ing the point quite far.
As to the second basis on which the English court sup-
ports its decision, namely, the present agile powers of the
law courts due to the merger of equity and law, the court
merely answered the Wood case, assuming that the result
of that case merely hinged on the lack of a seal on the
ticket and assuming that equity would decree a conveyance
be executed regardless of the lack of the seal. In regards
to the status of the parties before the ticketholder gains
entry to the place of amusement, it will suffice to reiterate
the doubt expressed above as to whether equity will en-
force a ticket as a conveyance, due to the facts that there
is lacking the necessary intent to make a conveyance and
that there is not adequate compliance with the Statute
of Frauds. Assuming that the necessary intent exists to
make a conveyance and the ticketholder has gained entry
into the theatre or race track, whatever the case might be,
is it not then too late to grant specific performance? With
the ejection, the damage is done; and, within the same day,
the interest that would have been conveyed would termi-
nate by the terms of the conveyance sought to be validated.
It seems idle to say that, because equity will validate a con-
veyance, such conveyance will be treated as existing and
operative. The point is that, until equity acts, no legal
interest passes; and, if equity never acts, no legal interest
passes. In the Hurst case, the Court treated as done what
it supposed could have been done. It is often said that
equity will consider as done what ought to have been done,
but treating as done that which could have been done seems
to be a rather novel idea. The court was never asked to make
the supposed conveyance effective; and it was too late for
equity to act in this respect at the time when the case first
came to trial. It might be said in passing that this founda-
tion for the result reached by this English court could not
be followed in Maryland, as there has been no substantive
merger of equity and law here.
Finding that within a contract creating a license there
also exists an implied contract not to revoke that license
is a discovery provoked largely by the imagination of the
court. Though quite ingenious, it has no objective founda-
tion. Historically, the term "license" embraced the con-
cepts of mere permission plus the power of retracting that
BSupra, n. 22.
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permission at any time. These concepts have continued to
prevail throughout the law, as seen by the fact that, even
today, the licensor can revoke the license even though the
licensee has expended great sums in reliance on the con-
tinued existence of the license. 4 Of course, if considera-
tion was given for that license, the licensee may bring a
suit for damages due to breach of contract. But this is his
only remedy. The conception of the term "license" clearly
negates the existence of an implied agreement not to revoke
it. Furthermore, the revocability clause found on most
tickets nowadays expressly denies the implication of any
agreement not to revoke the license granted thereby.
Most writers seem to favor the decision laid down in
the Hurst case, but purely from an equitable standpoint.
Their usual thesis is that the proprietor should be re-
strained from breaching his contract and doing grave in-
justice to the patron. However, in granting damages in a
tort action on the basis that the plaintiff had a property
right or an irrevocable license, the Hurst case distorts well-
established legal concepts. Those favoring this English
case seem primarily to agree with the result attained there-
in, rather than the reasons for the result, trying to justify
these reasons (for the result) by the result itself, indulging
in pure rationalization to reach the desired end rather
than a priori reasoning. If it is found that justice requires
one conclusion to be reached rather than another it is sug-
gested that courts and writers openly say so rather than
justify a result by disrupting long followed legal principles.
Whether justice demands that the result of the Hurst case
should be followed as a general rule will be referred to
later when discussing the question of damages for breach
of contract.
A few cases are usually cited as being in accord with the
rule that a patron of a place of amusement has an irrevoc-
able license, but it will be found that in most of the cases,
a suit for damages arising out of contract was involved or
that the proprietor or his servants were guilty of gross
misconduct analogous to the use of excessive force in eject-
ing a trespasser.35 What is said as to the irrevocability of
3 A. 2d 471, 120 A. L. R., 543 (1939) ; Noted in Note, Revocation of a
".Ucense Acted Upon" (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 362.
" Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. 234 (1880) (Dicta-A ticket granted more than
a mere license) (Overruled by Horney v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 20, 61 A. 1088. 1
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1184, 110 Am. St. Rep. 520, 5 Ann. Cas. 349 (1905)
Kelley v. Dent Theaters, 21 S. W. 2d 592 (Texas 1929), Court expressly
said it would not commit self as to the revocability of the license, though
giving damages to plaintiff; but, Terrell Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez,
182 S. W. 2d 824 (Texas 1944), said the patron's license was absolutely
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the license is usually dicta wholly immaterial to the par-
ticular case. The effect of holding the license revocable is
merely this: that the proprietor may, by revocation of the
license, consider the patron a trespasser and use that force
which is reasonable to eject him from the premises, without
being held liable in tort for assault and battery. Liability
for the use of excessive force and for breach of contract
are entirely different matters. These latter two points were
not involved in the Greenfeld case, no damages being re-
quested. The question of revocability of the license was
clearly in issue, and the Court upheld the power of revoca-
tion. Much doubt is had as to whether those courts that
have held in the favor of the patron on the question of
damages will take a view contrary to this Maryland case,
particularly in light of the fact that the Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Kentucky courts, when the question of the
revocability of the license was clearly before them, have
overruled the dicta of earlier cases in their respective juris-
dictions."
Although the Greenfeld case involved no question as
to damages, nevertheless, for the sake of completeness in
the discussion of the general topic, the rights of ticket-
holders to places of amusement, it is here appropriate to
treat also the subject of damages recoverable in an action
for breach of contract in a result of the plaintiff's ejection
from the theatre, race track, dance hail and the like. It
is conceded that the purchase of a ticket consummates a
contract, which is breached by a refusal to honor such ticket
at the entrance of the amusement place or by the ejection
of the patron from the amusement place without just cause.
The controversy arises as to the measures of damages.
Most cases, adhering closely to the doctrine of the power
of revocation and concluding that this doctrine sanctions
the so-called "absolute right of revocation", limit the
amount of damages to the mere purchase price of the
ticket. Some courts have taken a slightly modified position
revocable; and Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun. 242, 36 N. Y. Supp. 949, 72 N. Y.
St. Rep. 314 (1895), by dicta-that proprietor has no right to eject plaintiff
after inviting plaintiff to pay admission and come on premises. Accord
MacGowan v. Duff, 14 Daly 315 (N. Y. 1887); Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher,
119 S. W. 195 (Ky. App. 1909). Contra, Powell v. Weber-Stair Co., 12.5 S. W.
255 (Ky. App. 1910) ; Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 246 Ky. 130, 54 S. W.
2d 620 (1932) ; Bouknight v. Lester, 119 S. C. 466, 112 S. E. "974 (1921)
(damages for humiliation and embarrassment) ; Cummins v. St. Louis
Amusement Co., 147 S. W. 2d 190 (Mo. App. 1941).
Cf., 8tupra, n. 35.
See cases collected in 30 A. L. R. 951, most notable of which are: Mar-
rone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 961
(1913); Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball Club, 122 Wash. 276, 210 P. 679, 30
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and have granted, in addition to the mere purchase price
of the ticket, compensation for expenses incurred by the
plaintiff in order to attend the spectacle after the acquisi-
tion of his ticket." Other courts moreover; particularly in
the more recent cases where the actions were in contract,
have allowed exemplary damages for insult, embarrass-
ment and humiliation.39
Now, there is no question that an action for assault will
lie when the proprietor has used unreasonable force in
ejecting a patron, the rule being that only a reasonable
amount of force can be used when ejecting a trespasser,
which according to the majority of cases is the status of
a patron on the proprietor's premises after the license has
been revoked. Thus, when the patron is grabbed by the
arms and insulted, without a prior request to leave the
premises, an action will lie against the proprietor on this
theory.4" Another situation which is distinguishable from
the general type of case now under discussion is presented
by Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey4 wherein an usher had
used insulting language while the patrons were attempting
to get to their assigned seats. Held, that although the de-
fendant could have properly revoked the plaintiffs' licenses,
nevertheless, while the licenses remained operative and
unrevoked, the plaintiffs were entitled to civil treatment.
And needless to say, that while the patrons are duly on the
premises of the amusement operator, he owes them the
duty of exercising due care and of properly maintaining
the premises for the safeguard of their safety. In passing,
another situation might be mentioned, analogous to the
case in which excessive force is used in ejecting a patron.
Such situation is one in which the proprietor causes the
arrest of the patron where the conduct justifying the use
of force in the ejection does not justify the arrest under
the criminal code of the state. In such case, the proprietor
is liable for false arrest.42
A. L. R. 948 (1922) ; Horney v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 20, 61 A. 1088. 1 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1184, 110 Am. St. Rep. 520, 5 Ann. Cas. 349 (1905). Also Terrell
Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez, supra, n. 35; Buenzle v. Newport
Amusement Assn., 29 R. I. 23, 68 A. 721, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1242 (1908).
18 People v. Flynn, supra, n. 5; Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn.
35, 185 S. W. 692, L. R. A. 1916 E. 912 (1916). (Dicta-McCrea v. Marsh,
12 Gray 211, 71 Am. Dec. 745 (Mass. 1858).
so Smith v. Leo, supra, n. 35; Arron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736,
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 204 (1911) ; Bouknight v. Lester. supra, n. 35. Weber-
Stair Co. v. Fisher, 8upra, n. 35. Cases collected in 30 A. L. R. 955.
1o Ayres v. Middleton Theater, 210 S. W. 911 (Mo. App. 1919) ; Amuse-
ment Co. v. Spangler, 143 Md. 98, 121 A. 851 (1923).
"1 Supra, n. 38.
42 Rice v. Harrington, 38 R. 1. 47,94 A. 736, L. R. A. 1916 E. 356 (1915).
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But in a pure contract action, is the giving of damages
for insult, humiliation, and indignity justifiable? Usually,
the measure of damages in a contract action is stated to
be that loss accruing to the plaintiff which is the direct
and natural result of the breach of contract or those dam-
ages which the defendant could have reasonably foreseen
as flowing from the breach. The Restatement of Contracts
states the general rule in Section 333 in the following man-
ner:
"In awarding damages, compensation is given for
those injuries that the defendant has reason to foresee
as a probable result of his breach when the contract
was made. If the injury is one that follows the breach
in the usual course of events, there is a sufficient reason
for the defendant to foresee it; otherwise it must be
shown specifically that defendant had reason to know
the facts and foresee the injury."
Stopping at this point, there seems to be no theoretical
objection to the granting of damages for humiliation, insult
and indignity, flowing directly from the revocation of the
license granted by a ticket amounting to a breach of con-
tract. The Restatement in Sections 341 and 342 goes on to
say that, generally, punitive damages are not allowable for
breach of contract, except in cases of a common carrier
ejecting a passenger, of an innkeeper ejecting a guest, of
breach of contract of marriage, and in cases involving error
in the sending of death messages by telegraph companies;
that, generally, damages for mental disturbances resulting
from breach of contract are not given in the absence of
accompanying bodily harm. Now, it seems reasonable to
say that if damages for mental disturbance are given for
breach of a contract of carriage, they should also be given
for breach of contract of admission to an amusement, par-
ticularly when the patron has been ejected from the prem-
ises after gaining entry thereupon, because in both cases
the nature of the injury is the same and the damages are
requested for the same reason, namely, compensation for
the indignity and humiliation suffered by the passenger or
patron by reason of his ejection from a place where he
had a contractual right to be. The fact that the duty to
the public imposed on a common carrier is much greater
than the public duty imposed on a proprietor of a theatre
or ball park is here wholly immaterial, because the concept
of duty in this respect only concerns the scope of the con-
tract entered into. Extrinsically, a contract of carriage with
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a common carrier differs from the contracts in the ordinary
relations of parties to each other only in that such contract
'of carriage is one which the public carrier is not at liberty
to decline to make, where the would-be passenger has
brought himself within the requirements entitling him to
ask for the services of the carrier and he does in fact ask
for such services.43 On the question of whether punitive
damages should be granted in these cases, the scope of the
duty imposed by the contract seems irrelevant. The point
is that once the contract is breached, whether a contract of
carriage or a contract of admission to a spectacle, by the
expulsion of the passenger or patron, the nature of the
injury is the same; and, hence, the measure of damages
should be the same in either case. Therefore, from the
theoretical standpoint, there seems no obstacle to the grant-
ing of damages for humiliation, indignity, embarrassment,,
etc., in the action brought for the breach of a contract of
admission.
However, looking at the problem from a practical angle,
an entirely opposite aspect is encountered. In a large num-
ber of these cases of ejection, the patron is found to be a
wrongdoer as he was in the Wood case, where the plaintiff
was found to have attempted to drug the horses. Professor
Conard" points out that interviews with the various at-
torneys for the New York Theatres disclose the fact that
an ejection is never made arbitrarily, in fact, an expulsion
of a patron is always sought to be prevented. The pro-
prietors realize that misconduct on their part means the
loss of good will; and the threat or fear of financial loss is
found an adequate deterrent to the unreasonable expul-
sions of patrons from their theatres. Of the nine cases cited
by Professor Conard as having favored the patron on the
question of damages, there existed in seven cases an excuse
for the ejection 5.4  Here is the important fact to consider:
cases have held that a proprietor owes a duty to his patrons
"Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Arnold, 121 Va. 204, 92 S. E. 925 (1917).
"Conard, The Privilege of Forcibly Ejecting an An, tsenievt Patron (1942)
90 Pa. L. R. 809.
1In Sparrow v. Johnson, 8 Quebec Official L. Rep. 379 (Q. B. 1899)
plaintiff was a negro; for a discussion of Hearst v. Pictures Theatres, ef.
text, circa, n. 31. In Taylor v. Waters, supra, n. 26. defendants were as-
signees of the original licensor. The remainder of cases are cited, .upra,
n. 35. In the Arron case, plaintiff was believed to have been involved in
a quarrel with another patron; in the Drew case, plaintiff was a negro:
in the Cummins case a commotion within the theatre was believed charge-
able to plaintiff: in the Bouknight case, plaintiff used a ticket that de-
fendant held was void; in the MacGowan case, plaintiff presented ticket
for the wrong night. Only in the Smith case does no reason appear for
plaintiff's ejection from a dance hall.
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to maintain peace arid order within his premises.40 As the
proprietor has such a duty, social policy seems to dictate
that the proprietor should be allowed, without unreason-
able restraints, to eject anyone suspected of causing a dis-
turbance or who is likely to cause such a disturbance. To
put the proprietor in fear of being held liable in damages
for breach of contract beyond the mere price of admission,
would confront him with this dilemma: Whether to risk
a disturbance which might render him liable to his other
patrons, or to eject the suspected instigator of the disorder
on the fear that he, the proprietor, will later be held liable
in damages for breach of contract if the one ejected turns
out to be an innocent patron. In the light of this fact, the
granting of the right of expulsion without the fear of being
held for punitive damages thereafter is not unreasonable,
particularly when it has been shown that the. exercise of
this power is adequately controlled by financial considera-
tions. The suggestion that the proprietor should be free
from liability if he had reason to believe a just cause existed
for the expulsion does not help matters any because of the
fact that the question of the proprietor's having such a rea-
son for expulsion would have to be left for the determina-
tion of the jury, thus making the proprietor run the risk
of the possibility of the jury finding adversely to him. Also,
letting a jury solve additional problems adds more uncer-
tainty to the law. Professor Conard, though ambiguous as
to whether he favors the "absolute right of revocation"
doctrine, suggests an additional reason for giving such right
to race track operators, namely, that the patrons there do
not occupy a fixed place throughout the races and thus
cannot be constantly observed, and, as the evils are numer-
ous, in such an enterprise, the slightest suspicion that one
is undesirable should justify an expulsion of that person.
The doctrine of the absolute right of revocability of tick-
ets may, at times, work a hardship on an innocent person.
If the proprietor ejects a patron just for mere personal
reasons, the patron is no doubt harmed, and the conduct of
the proprietor in such case is grossly unjust. But such a
case arises too infrequently to warrant a change of the
doctrine.
In conclusion, one final distinction should be drawn.
Cases have arisen where the patron had been given a ticket
to a different performance than the one he wished to
16 Savannah Theaters Co. v. Brown, 36 Ga. App. 352, 136 S. E. 478 (1927) ;




attend; and, having appeared at the time he originally in-
tended, he found another claiming his seat. Being con-
sidered the wrongdoer, he was subjected to insulting and
humiliating language and ejected "in utter disregard of
his rights". Damages were granted for such insult and
humiliation. 7 Now, upon examination of such cases, it is
found that such insult does not flow from the breach of
contract alone. The insult for which damages were given
as compensation was the insult following from the addi-
tional conduct of the proprietor and servants extrinsic to
the contract and its breach. Hence, such damages do not
compensate for an injury flowing from the breach and
should not be considered as damages recovered for breach
of the contract. Such cases are analogous to those involving
the use of excessive force in ejecting a trespasser. The thing
compensated for in such cases is the unnecessary insult.
Dean Prosser recognizes that from these cases there is
developing the new tort of "insult".48
The Court of Appeals has left the question of damages
for breach of contract of admission wide open, saying: "We
see no reason for declining to follow the rule (of the Mar-
rone case), especially when no question of breach of con-
tract or specific performance is involved."4 What course
the Court will take remains to be seen. The clause on a
ticket limiting the damages to a refund of its purchase
price presents no solution as the Court could easily render
such clause ineffectual by holding it not a fair estimate of
damages that would result from the contract's breach.
PARKING LOT - BAILMENT -THEFT BY EMPLOYEE
Goldberg v. Kunz1
The defendant operated a garage and parking lot where
the plaintiff stored his car for ten days. The keys to the
car were left with the defendant who promised to let no
one have them. The following Sunday an employee, about
whom the defendant knew very little, was left in full
charge of the lot and garage. The employee took the car
from the garage and went on a frolic of his own which
resulted in damage to the automobile. The defendant's
1 Metts v. Charleston Theater Co., 105 S. C. 19, 89 S. . 389 (1916)
Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, supra, n. 35.
"PRosssm, TORTS (1941) 59, et seq.
Supra, n. 1, 337.
1 185 Md. 492, 45 A. 2d 279 (1946).
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